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The Part-Whole Relation in Spinoza’s Concept of the Individual 
 
Tatsuya Tachibana 
 
The question about parts and whole might be regarded as the most basic question of 
metaphysics. In this presentation, I will discuss this question in connection with the 
problem of persistence through change. For this purpose, I want to clarify Spinoza’s 
view to the part-whole relation by focusing on his concept of the individual. Since this 
concept has an idea about the relation: Spinoza supposes that the individual as a whole 
does not change even though its parts change. However, philosophers of Mechanism in 
17th century must not have allowed this supposition. It is because one think that, in 
Mechanism, a composite is made of parts and conceived through them, and then the 
composite’s identity depends on its parts. From this it follows that any change of parts 
means the change of its whole, which is the individual. That is problem of persistence 
through change. But Spinoza seems not to think like this. To explain its persistence 
through change, he introduces the notion of “form” of the individual. In my opinion, 
Spinoza’s concept of the individual elaborated by the form can reply this problem. 
Before discussing the definition of the individual, I show what he says about parts 
and whole in general. This is to be find in Spinoza’s correspondence with Oldenburg, 
Letter 32. He says “[c]oncerning whole and parts, I consider things as parts of some 
whole insofar as the nature of the one so adapts itself to the nature of the other that so 
far as possible they are all in harmony with one another. But insofar as they are out of 
harmony with one another, to that extent each forms an idea distinct from the others 
in our mind, and therefore it is considered as a whole and not as a part,” and then 
“every body, insofar as it exists modified in a certain way, must be considered as a 
part of the whole universe, must agree with the whole to which it belongs, and must 
cohere with the remaining bodies (tr. Curley, in A Spinoza Reader, 1994, Princeton 
University Press.)” In this text, we must pay attention to two words: “adapt” and 
“agree.” From these words I want to derive Spinoza’s idea about parts and the whole. 
   The definition of individual, in the texts following scholium of proposition 13 in part 
2 of Spinoza’s Ethics, states “[w]hen a number of bodies, …are so constrained by other 
bodies (composing the same individual) …if they so move, whether with the same 
degree or different degrees of speed, that they communicate their motion to each other 
in a certain fixed manner, we shall say that those bodies are united with one another 
and that they all together compose one body or individual (ibid. emphasis added.)” I 
will demonstrate that the definition involves the part-whole relation. For this purpose, 
I reconsider the references to this in Lemmas and proposition 24 in the same part of 
the Ethics. So, it might be clear that the form of the individual, also called certa ratio, 
is placed in the particular position, and therefore it functions to avoid the problem. 
